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ABSTRACT 
After providing some background information on the China Shenzhen 
stock market and then the details of the constraints on dividend distribution in 
China, this paper examines the general behavior of publicly listed firms of 
Shenzhen, in terms of their dividend policies. Results of the examination 
support the author's contentions. These are: 1) Firms listed in Shenzhen 
retain most of the earnings and distribute low cash dividends; 2) At the same 
time, they pursue high stock dividend policies; 3) Dividend policies of a large 
number of listed firms are in effect “net negative dividend” policies if rights 
issues are taken Into considerations; 4) Dividend policies of a large number of 
listed firms are highly complex in design; 5) For some listed firms, dividend 
policies often result in changes in equity stakes, among the shareholders. 
The author has explained how the low cash dividend policies suit 
China's current frictional, heterogeneous, “money-thirsty” capital market 
» 
conditions. The popularity of stock dividends Is explained as a result of the 
customary practice of equating stock and cash dividends In the calculation of 
1 
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dividend payout ratio. Such a practice makes stock dividend a good substitute 
for cash dividend in the signal function. 
Often Shenzhen listed firms may distribute dividends of different forms 
(cash vis-^vis stock) to different shareholders in the perception that there 
exists preference for cash dividends among those holding unlisted and hence 
un-tradable shares than among those who hold listed public shares. 
A simplified time series and cross-sectional review suggest 
inconclusively that there also exist differences between China listed firms and 
their western counterparts, in terms of stability of dividend amount, cash 
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1.1 Objective and Stracture 
This project is a behavioral study of the dividend policies of the firms listed on 
Shenzhen Securities Exchange, the People's Republic of China. 
Though dividend policy is one of the most confounding topics in corporate 
finance，it was never a concern in China until the late 80s when the PRC enterprises 
started to incorporate and list themselves on stock exchange. Thanks to the new-
sprung China stock market, dividend became a household word to millions of 
investors. Most investors perceive dividends to be relevant and that a proper dividend 
payout would enhance the listed firm's value. Discussions and evaluations appear here 
and there. Yet there are no specific and detailed studies on dividend policies in China. 
Interestingly, nobody has ever mentioned Miller and Modigliani's (M&M) irrelevancy 
theorem. Outside China, there appear to be few scholars engaged in studies of dividend 
policies in China. 
This paper tries to fill in the gap and therefore attempts to be an original study. 
Due to the lack of organized data and information and the incompleteness or mistakes 
in the available raw data, there may be some omissions and errors in this study. 
However, this study could be helpful as a reference. The author expects the ideas 
t 
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expressed here would be of interest to researchers who may wish to conduct further 
studies in this area. 
In this project, the author has focused mainly on the behavioral patterns of 
Shenzhen listed firms in setting their dividend policies, rather than the stock market's 
reaction to such policies. The author believes the latter is more difficult to identify at 
峰 
present. In addition, this study puts an emphasis on the common characteristics rather 
than the differences in the dividend policies of the these firms. Chapter 5 of this thesis 
is the key chapter that presents such efforts. 
The plan of the thesis is as follows. Section 1.2 of this chapter provides a 
general introduction of dividends and dividend policy. Chapter 2 briefly reviews 
relevant academic and empirical studies on dividend policies. Chapter 3 is a very brief 
introduction to the Shenzhen stock market. Chapter 4 is also mainly for reference and 
outlines the legal constraints and practical issues of Shenzhen listed firms' vis-a-vis 
their dividend policies. After the background of the previous chapters，the author 
suggests several hypotheses in Section 5.1 of Chapter 5. In Section 5.2, the author 
provides organized data to support his hypotheses. Then in Section 5.3, he gives 
further explanations to the evidence of Section 5.2. Finally, in Section 5.4, a rough 
description of the market response is provided. Chapter 6 provides an inconclusive 
time series and cross-sectional inter-industry comparison. Chapter 7 presents the 
conclusions. 
,The study concerns only the Shenzhen listed firms' dividend policies. The 
author believes that finiis listed in Shanghai would have a similar pattern. There will 
definitely be some subtle differences and such differences may be worth further studies. 
* 
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1,2 Dividends and PiTidend Policy 
Dividend refers to the portion of earnings that firms distribute to shareholders 
in proportion to the shares held. Dividend distribution can be annual or semiannual. In 
addition to regular dividends, firms sometimes pay an extra dividend which is 
understood to be non-repeating. Strictly speaking, dividends are not necessarily related 
to the current year's earnings. Finns can pay dividends even if there is a loss in the 
current year. Yet, people usually regard dividends as distribution from current year's 
earnings. 
Dividends in the narrowest sense refer to cash dividends. In a broader sense, 
.dividends can also be stock dividends. Stock dividends arise when companies distribute 
certain new shares to shareholders' accounts in proportion to shares already held by 
them. Stock dividends involve no money transfer and are therefore not substantially 
_ 
different from stock splits. Both increase the number of shares held per shareholder 
and conversely, reduce stake per new share, such that the total stake held by any 
shareholder is unchanged. The only distinction is in the accounting treatment: stock 
splits reduce the par value of shares, whereas stock dividend distribution involves a 
transfer from retained earnings to equity capital. Most people treat large stock 
dividend distribution as the same as stock splits. 
For many firms, a rights issue relates to dividend policy. The author contends 
that in an even broader sense, the rights issue is an extension and a part of dividend 
policies and its essence is "negative dividends." This study of Shenzhen listed firms' 
dividend policies setting concerns itself with this broadest understanding of dividends. 
\ 
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Under constraints of relevant state laws, company articles, and debt covenants, 
firms can decide dividend polices at their discretion: dividend omission, cash dividend 
distribution, stock dividend distribution, or both cash and stock distribution. If we 
consider rights issues to be negative dividends, there are eight possible scenarios 
instead of four. 
Regarding cash dividends, there are two measures of dividend policy. We can 
either compare current dividends to past years' dividends to judge if there is an 
increase in absolute amount; or calculate the cash payout ratio, which is to divide 
dividends by current earnings. Consequently, firms can adopt policies that may result in 
a fixed dividend (or floating within a range), in absolute amount; or maybe a fixed 
payout ratio (or floating with in a range). Firms can also set a gradually increasing 
dividend policies or other policies that show some degree of steadiness and 
smoothness. Of course, firms can also at their discretion set dividends at random and 
without continuity. 
I 




One of the earliest and the most important research on dividend policies is that 
of Lintner [1956]. After a series of interviews with company managers, Lintner finds 
that unless there is an important and substantial change in a firm's earning power, the 
management is inclined to maintain stability of dividend distribution. The stability is 
visible in their policy of limited changes in dividends, judging by absolute amounts. It 
is also seen in the fact that firms try to have a target payout ratio that is fixed or 
floating within a narrow range, for a long period. 
According to Lintner's model, companies set cash dividends mainly on the 
basis of current earnings and the target payout ratio. Also influencing is last year's 
dividend (allowance for change in dividends by absolute amount). In short, companies 
do not set dividend policies at random or in disregard to fiindamentals. 
However, Miller and Modigliani [1961] point out that, if in practice dividends 
are not set at random, in theory the dividend policies are irrelevant to company's value 
and can be set at discretion. Under the assumptions of no tax discrimination, 
information symmetry, transaction costs approaching zero, and independence of 
investment decisions from financing behavior, firms can distribute dividends of any 
amounts. Any fund needed for such distribution can be financed at the same capital 
cost. For investors，dividends and capital appreciation are equivalent. Dividends result 
I 
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in corresponding decrease of share value ex-dividend. Therefore dividend policy is only 
a "mathematical game” for both firms and investors. 
Miller & ModigUanTs "Dividend & Debt Irrelevancy" theory is a major 
breakthrough in modem finance. However the assumptions mentioned above can not 
stand true in real world. Empirical studies for the famous hypothesis "dividend policies 
can not result in risk-adjusted abnormal returns" have shown mixed and often negative 
results. Therefore, later researches concentrate on the relevant side of dividend policies 
instead of their theoretical irrelevance. 
Taxation of dividends is often at a disadvantage compared with capital 
appreciation. Dividend allocation (and the subsequent external financing to compensate 
cash outflow when necessary) will result in certain amounts of transaction costs. Thus 
under M&M frame, dividend distribution will reduce shareholders' wealth. 
On the other hand，according to Easterbrook [1984]，s agency costs model, 
dividend distribution helps reduce agency costs that arise due to separation of 
ownership and management. Easterbrook [1984] divides agency costs into two 
categories: monitoring expenditures, and opportunity expenditures. The reason for 
investors' demand of dividends is that dividend distribution will improve company's 
reliance on external capital. The external capital financing would associate well with 
overall audit and performance appraisal. The opportunity expenditures due to external 
financing would be remarkably lower than monitoring expenditures for directly 
monitoring managerial behavior. In addition, dividend distribution can reduce degree 
of information asymmetry. Managers can rely on dividend policies to signal the firms' 
financial positions and prospects. Such signaling effects would also lower the agency 
costs. To sum up, according to agency theory, investors usually welcome dividends 
\ 
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which result in net decrease of agency costs. It also explains that a firm asking for 
refinancing after dividend distribution is not as uneconomical as it appears to be. 
Trends in the literature continue to focus on behavioral or cognitive elements 
of corporate dividend policies setting (see Miller [1986], for a general review 
summary). Three major functions are found: net decrease of agency costs; signaling 
effect; wealth transfer from creditor to shareholders. These offer possible explanations 
to the empirical findings that there exists investor's "cash preference" (see Long 
[1978])，An interesting explanation is by Shefrin and Statman [1984]. They suggest 
that, according to Thaler & Shefrin’s self control theory, “cash preference" may be 
positively correlated to age and negatively correlated to savings. Therefore, investors 
may differ in attitudes due to different income and expenditure pattern. Christie [1984] 
finds a U shape attitude towards decrease of dividends. There are no obvious 
differences in negative impacts of large decrease of dividends and total cut of 
dividends. 
There are fewer concerns about stock dividends. In substance, a stock 
dividend is only a transfer in terms of accounting. Yet empirical studies find that the 
market responses have largely been favorable. The early studies done by Dolley 
[1933], Barker [1956], and Sussman [1962], identify the main reasons for stock splits 
.(and thus stock dividends). These are to conserve cash; to facilitate future equity 
financing (by lowering the subscription price and increasing the number of shareholders 
outstanding); to please the shareholders by giving something they perceive as having 
value. Later researchers suggest stock splits and stock dividends may convey 
"economic value" (for details, see Nichols [1978]). Doran [1994] contends it may be 
because stock dividends convey strong optimistic messages to the market and there 
8 
also exists an "attraction effect": financial analysts usually adjust upwards, the earning 
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CHAPTER 3 
A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE SHENZHEN STOCK MARKET 
Till now, there are two security exchanges in China: one in Shanghai and the 
other in Shenzhen. As this study focuses on Shenzhen listed firms, it does not discuss 
the development of Shanghai Stock market. In brief, Shanghai stock market was 
developed later than Shenzhen's but has now emerged to be bigger in size. In other 
respects these two stock markets have been largely similar in their development. 
Shenzhen stock market, counting from the equity issue of the first public 
company in Shenzhen-Shenzhen Development in May 1987, already has a nine 
years long history. The secondary market began with the listing of Shenzhen 
Development Bank in April 1988. However, trading until December 1990 was of over 
the counter (OTC) type. The Shenzhen stock exchange began regular operations in 
December 1990. 
The following is a brief chronological review of Shenzhen stock market: 
March 1987 一 April 1990: This period can be described as an "introductory 
stage". At the time people had little knowledge of stocks. The equity issues met 
tremendous difficulties in subscription. By early 1989, the first issue (Shenzhen 
Development Bank) and second issue (Shenzhen Wanke) had appeared and proved 
unsuccessful. The government had to order compulsory subscription of 50% of total 
stocks in the Development Bank case. In Wanke case, the underwriter had to subscribe 
10 
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to the leftover 25%. In 1989, investors found that, in less than two years the cash 
dividend returns from Shenzhen Development had already exceeded the initial 
subscription price. Such high returns facilitated the third and forth rounds of issuing of 
equity in 1989 and early 1990. Yet, the secondary market was still inactive. 
April 90 一 February 93: During this period, the Shenzhen Stock Market saw 
several ups and downs, but, in general，there was an upwards trend. This corresponded 
with China's rapid economic growth in early 90s, yet the widely accepted major reason 
was that supply of equity issues could not satisfy the ever-increasing demand for 
financial assets by private investors. The market was so speculative that the 
government had frequently interfered. However，the government's determination to 
develop China stock market largely offset its 'suppressing' policies. 
February 93 - the present: Stock market has seen a declining trend after 
February 93. The macro-economics adjustments, high-inflation rate, and the listings of 
new issues, have given rise to the present bearish situation. For details, see Table 1 
and Chart 1. 
One of the most important features of China stock market is that state and legal 
shares occupy controlling stakes in most listed firms. Such shares are not listed on the 
Exchange and thus not traded. Percentage holding varies from industry to industry, and 





An overview of Shenzhen Stock Market 
(RMB m i l l i o n ) 1 9 8 8 1989 1990 1991 ~ ~ 侧 
No. of listed 2 5 6 23 77 
Firms 
Total Mkt. NA NA 8076 49496 133412 
Capitalization 
Turnover Volume NA 3606 47661 135373 
Sources: Annual Report on Shenzhen Securities Market 1994 
Chart 1 
Shenzhen Composite Index 
Mar. 1991-Dec. 1994 
400 T 
3 0 0 
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PRACTICES OF AND CONSTRAINTS ON SHENZHEN 
PUBLICLY LISTED FIRMS' DIVIDEND POLICIES 
4,1 Legal Constraints on Dividends 
Dividend policies of listed firms are regulated and constrained by Jhe Company 
Law of People'f； Republic of China (hereafter called the Company Law)，other 
regulations set by the Security Committee of the State Council, the Security 
Regulatory Commission, and regional authorities (such as the Security Management 
Offices in Shanghai and Shenzhen). At the same time, they should also be in 
accordance with company's articles. 
It is expressed in The Company Law that the profit distribution proposals of 
listed firms should be drawn up by the board of directors (Section 112, of the 
Company Law unless otherwise stated) and be subject to permission of the 
shareholders' meeting (Section 102)： 
As to the profit distribution, there are no explicit statements admitting dividend 
distribution when the firms suffer loss. Section 129，The Temporary Regulations on 
Securities Issue and Trade (hereafter as the Temporary Regulations), states "when the 
in-surplus collective reserve of firms exceeds 50 per cent of registered capital, firms are 




When the compulsory collective reserve is not able to compensate the last 
year's loss, firms should compensate the loss by current year's profit. Afterwards, 10 
per cent of net profit should be retained as compulsory collective reserve till this 
reserve reaches 50 per cent of the registered capital. Another 5-10 per cent of profit is 
for welfare fund (similar to 'pension fund') (Section 180). The non-compulsory 
collective reserve retention is after that for the welfare fund, and the necessity and 
amount are subject to the permission of the shareholders' meeting (Section 177). 
The balance portion of profit may be distributed according to the proportion of 
shares held. The Company Law does not state if dividends should be in cash or as 
stock dividends. As per the Temporary Regulations, firms can distribute dividends in 
cash and for as stock (Section 40), while according to the Company Law，stock 
dividends are defined as new shares and the estimated profit rate should be more than 
the current bank deposit interest rate (Section 137). 
To conclude: 
(A) It is not expressed in the Company Law that firms should not distribute 
dividend when at loss. 
(B) The historical loss constrains the current dividend distribution. 
(C) Generally, the dividend should not exceed 85 per cent of the net profit. The 
compulsory collective reserve does not need to exceed 50 per cent of the registered 
capital. The shareholders' meeting can decide to transfer collective reserve to capital 
account as long as remaining collective reserve is not less than 25 per cent of the 
registered capital Thus in effect, the Company Law does not create practical 
restrictions to the stock dividend distribution. 
I 
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(D) Cash dividend exceeding 95 per cent of the net profit，should not be 
distributed (if not r^aining collective reserve); 
(E) Cash and stock dividends are not distinguished in the Company Law. It is 
also not stated that the value of stock dividend must be represented by its par value. It 
is however, mentioned that stock dividend can be distributed to capitalize collective 
reserve; 
(F) There is no mention in the Company Law as to whether rights issue should 
be treated as new share issue. 
(G) There aren't any constraints in the Company Law on dividend policies due 
to debt covenants. 
As the Company Law was passed by the National Conference and is effective 
since July 1st, 1994，this study, which relates to the dividend policies before the end of 
1993, would not be affected essentially. The new law is not retrospective. 
4.2 Stintdaticms in Otnpanv Articles 
The distribution of profit should comply with company articles. Profit 
distribution, collective reserve retention, welfare fund retention, and dividend payout 
ratio are highlighted and set specifically and separately in company articles. As per the 
• articles of the first 16 listed firms in Shenzhen, the fund for dividend distribution 
usually occupies 30 to 55 per cent of the profit after tax. As dividends can be cash and 
/or stock according to these articles, the above percentages actually are the ceiling for 
cash dividend payout ratios. Only 4 listed firms have specified in their articles when 
and how often to distribute dividends. 
15 
4.3 Constraints of Authorities cm Dividetid Policies 
The main authorities in decreasing order of importance are the Security 
Committee, the Security Regulatory Commission, Shanghai and Shenzhen Security 
Management Office, and other relevant taxation and state assets authorities. These 
authorities promulgate regulations/notices which play an important role in dividend 
distribution and rights issues. Presented here chronologically, are major contents of the 
regulations after 1993, except the first one that pertains to 1990. As a matter of fact, 
the authorities have seriously been considering the dividend and the rights issue 
policies only since 1994. 
July 1st, 1990: Shenzhen government stipulated that on the portion of the 
dividend exceeding one year bank deposit interest, the investors should pay individual 
income tax. 
March 4th, 1994: The Shenzhen Security Management Office issued "Notice 
on Circulation of New Shares after Rights Issue by Listed Firms," stipulating that new 
state shares, legal or founders' shares due to rights issue can be listed in the securities 
exchange. The Security Management stressed that it reserves the right to decide the 
acceleration or the delaying of the listing. 
March 5th, 1994: The Security Regulatory Commission negated the March 4, 
1994 notice issued about listing of new shares after rights issue. 
March 12, 1994: The chairman of the Security Regulatory Commission, Mr. 
Liu Hong-ru, announced ‘Four "NO"s' policies to save the securities market. One 
"No" is that listed firms should not abuse the power of rights issues. 
I 
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May 12, 1994: The State Taxation Bureau stated that stock dividend should be 
taxed by 20 per cent of the par value. The Shenzhen Taxation Bureau announced 
postponement of the effective date of this regulation. 
Oct. 5th, 1994: The Security Committee gave out a notice about normalizing 
rights issue behavior and the maximum allowance in a year for rights issue is to be 30 
per cent of the existing shares. 
Oct. 26，1994: The State Assets Bureau announced that listed firms should 
normalize their rights issue behavior and state shareholders should assume their duties 
strictly according to 'Notice About Protecting the State Share Equity During Rights 
Issuing'. 
Nov. 31，1994: The Security Committee issued a notice that listed firms 
should strictly comply with regulations during rights issuing. It also said that before 
new regulations come out, the new state/legal shares after the rights issue and dividend 
distribution, should not be listed for the time being. 
Dec. 14’ 1994: The State Assets Bureau issued 'the Notice on Problems of 
Rights Issue on State Share and Equity Transference', stipulating that the equity 
transference of state shares should be examined by the State Assets Bureau and the 
examination document was necessary when reexamining the rights issue. 
Influences of the laws and regulations above mainly are: 1) The additional 10% 
tax on dividend exceeding bank interest in 1990s and the postponement of the 20% 
levy on stock dividends were both based on market conditions. The former practice 
favored low dividend policies in early stage, the latter encouraged firms to distribute 
more stock dividends; 2) The constraints on rights issue show the intentional "total 
control" by government in tight money condition; 3) Worry of government about state 
17 
equity loss shows dividend and rights issue policies may to some extent cause changes 
of equity structure. 
4,4 Practice of EHiddend Policies 
The profit distribution proposals are drawn up by the board of directors and 
promulgated in annual reports within 120 days after the end of a fiscal year. They 
include profit retaining and dividend declaration per share. As to the ratios of cash and 
stock in dividend, they are not necessarily included in the annual report. Rights issue 
proposals are also not necessarily included. 
The time when the shareholders' meeting should be held, may vary from 
company to company. The shareholders' meeting examines the current year's annual 
report and dividend, and rights issue proposals. Afterwards, dividend and rights issue 
proposals are submitted to the Security Management Office for permission. If such 
proposals concern themselves with state equity or warrants transference, the 
permission of the regional state assets bureau is also needed. 
After obtaining all necessary permissions, listed firms are able to start 
distribution, set rights register closing day, ex-dividend day and stock dividend listing 
day, etc. Detailed introduction on procedures is available in The New Handbook of 
Stock Market compiled by Shenzhen Newlands Co.. 
Dividends and rights issues may be announced simultaneously but this is not 
compulsory. The former are usually declared in March • July for the previous year 
while the practice for the latter is determined by actual market conditions. 
Some listed firms issue B Shares (for, and tradable among, overseas investors). 
B share holders would receive the same dividends as local shareholders except that the 
18 
currency is foreign (HK dollars for Shenzhen listed firms). The dividends for B shares 
may be different from local shares if there exist equity issue time differences. Such a 
different treatment is only done once, in the beginning and is stated in the prospectus. 
There may be some specific features in dividend setting in those firms which issue B 




A GENERAL BEHAVIOR STUDY ON SHENZHEN 
PUBLICLY LISTED FIRMS' DIVIDEND POLICY 
5.1 Hypotheses 
According to M&M Model，in a M y efficient capital market, to lend and to 
borrow money cost the same. Thus the financing ability of firms is infinitely large，and 
the firms have high flexibility on when and how to carry out financing. If the taxation 
treatment of debt capital and equity capital for firms is not different, there is also no 
tax disadvantage for investors on dividends as compared with capital appreciation, then 
different distribution and financing methods (earnings retaining, new share issuing or 
bond issuing) would not affect company value. In such circumstance，dividend policies 
would be unnecessary and would only be a "mathematical game". 
Alternatively, firms are able to choose dividend policies to be whatever and 
however they like. They can either issue new shares after distributing all dividends to 
compensate cash outflow, or distribute no dividends at all. There are no differences in 
costs or in substance. Neither will increase or reduce the financing cost of firms. 
Correspondingly, neither will influence the investment behavior of firms. 
The irrelevancy of dividend policies expounded by M&M Model denies any 
worth of dividends. Still, even if the dividend policies are irrelevant, their patterns can 
20 
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have some common features It is also worth noticing that the several assumptions for 
the irrelevancy can only exist under ideal states. Hence we deduce that, in an imperfect 
capital market like China, dividend policies of listed firms are not only relevant, but 
also affect firms' values. 
Obviously, the assumption that to lend and borrow money cost the same，does 
not stand in China. China, experiencing the course of industrialization, is capital thirsty. 
Besides, the capital markets appear frictional and disintegrated: interest rates are 
regulated by the central bank and can not reflect the balance of money supply and 
demand (the existence of gray money market is an evidence). Banks still have a long 
way to go before fiiU commercialization and corporate bond market hasn't taken a 
shape. Capital thirst and market friction together mean the realities in China are far 
different from M&M assumption. 
In this period in China, listed firms are experiencing a course of development. 
They have vigorous demand for capital but limited financing abilities. Corporate bonds 
have difficulties in being issued or do not find a sufficiently liquid secondary market 
New share issues and rights issues suffer from the restrictions of government policies 
Therefore retained earnings are the cheapest fund for expansion. For this reason, we 
suppose that the cash dividend payout ratios of Shenzhen listed firms are low 
(Hypothesis 1). 
Hypothesis 1 is also based on the fact that there are no effective monitoring 
mechanisms on managerial behavior, which is inclined towards growth of corporate 
size and investors have more interest in the market prices than in dividends (for further 
explanation, sees Section 5.3). 
� 
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At the same time, in the China stock market where information is asymmetric 
and not transparent, we believe that dividend should play a strong signaling role. When 
� 
the distribution of stock dividend relates to earnings, and firms are not obliged to pay 
any actual cash dividends, we could suppose that firms distribute stock dividend 
generously (Hypothesis 2) to signal satisfactory current earnings and optimistic 
prospects. 
Dividend policy, in this study, also includes rights issue policy. Thus, we can 
hypothesize that there is actually a net cash inflow resulting from dividends payout 
accompanied by rights issue by the Shenzhen listed firms. That is，a number of listed 
firms conduct rights issues which would result in net negative dividend (Hypothesis 3). 
We also suppose that listed firms in China, to M y utilize dividend policies as 
signals and to reduce agency costs, may adopt complicated dividend policies 
(Hypothesis 4). Thus they may distribute stock dividends to indicate earnings, pay 
cash dividends to indicate healthy financial positions, and offer rights issues to show 
capital needs for expansion. 
Finally, equity structure of listed firms in China includes state shares，legal 
shares, public shares and employee shares. Only public shares are listed in security 
exchanges (employee share will be listed gradually in six months after new issue) and 
correspondingly possess liquidity. It can be asserted that different shareholders prefer 
different kinds of dividends due to different liquidities. Thus, it is possible to assume 
that some listed firms apply different dividend policies to different shareholders without 
breaching laws. Thus these different dividend distribution policies (hereafter referred to 
as DDD in short) result in changes of shareholders' stakes (Hypothesis 5). 
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5.2 Evideace 
Since many listed firms have not yet announced their dividend policies for 
1994, and because there were not many listed firms before 1993, we have selected 
I 
mainly the dividend policies related to 1993 earnings (announced in 1994) 
to test the five hypotheses of Section One. 1992 dividend policies are also selected 
where possible. As data are limited to one year, they may not be conclusive. This is the 
major limitation of this paper. 
Data Support for Hypothesis 1: Low Cash 
Dividend Payout Ratio 
Table 2 
Cash Payout Ratio of Shenzhen Listed Firms 
1991 1993 I 1993 
No. of samples 4 ' 一 2 2 ° 90 = — 9 0 一 
Cash Payout Ratio: Mean 12.77% 21.03% 13.75% 
Std. Deviation. 7.84% 15.16% 21.11% 17.80% 
Median ~5 .56% 11.65% 13.70% 10.00% 
— Zero PividendT 2 50% — 24 
一 Low Dividend ( 0 % - 2 0 % r 2 50% ~ 9 86% 30 33% 31 34% 
Medium Dividend (20% - 50%) 3 _ _ 2 0 22% 
High Dividend (50% - ) | 9 10% | 3 3% 
Source: 1. New Handbook of Shenzhen Stock Market 1993; 
* 2. Annual Report on Shenzhen Securities Market 1994; 
3. Dynamic Analysis of Stock Market, vol. 4.5.6，1995. 
Notes: a. Up to 1991, there were 5 firms in Shenzhen, one of which isn't appropriate to be chosen here 
because of de-listing. 
b. Up to the end of 1992, there were 23 listed firms in Shenzhen, one is excluded for the same reason 
as a^ve. 
c. Up to the end of Feb. 1994，the number of firms listing in Shenzhen rose to 90. The left column is 
the average cash dividend payout ratios of each company for all shareholders. The right column is the 
cash dividend payout ratios for public shareholders. The differences between these two ratios result 
from DDDs of some listed firms. 
\ 
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It can be seen in Table 2 that, generally speaking, listed firms pursue policies of 
low cash dividend payout ratios. In 1992 and 1993, public shareholders obtained 
average cash dividends less than 14 per cent of net earnings. What's more, 40 per cent 
oflisted firms in 1993 did not pay public shareholders any cash dividends at all. 
t 
Historically, the average cash dividend payout ratio of the US firms has floated 
around 50 per cent. Compared to this figure, the cash dividend payout ratio of 
Shenzhen listed firms is low. 
The average price-earning ratio of Shenzhen listed firms, calculated on the 
basis of the closing index of 1994 and the earnings level of 1993, is about 13. Thus, 
the cash dividend yield of Shenzhen listed firms is slightly more than 1 per cent, which 
is reckoned as extremely low dividend yield rate compared to three per cent of the 
international standard. 
Data Support for Hypothesis 2: High Stock Dividend Policies 
Tables 
An Overview of 91-93' Stock Dividend DistHbution 
Policies of Shenzhen Listed firms 
1991 1992 
No. of Samples 4 22 ^ ^ 
No. of Stock Mean 0.34 0-33 Q ^ 
Dividends Per Share Std. Dev." 0.29 Q2Q 0 2 7 — — 
(without weighting) Median 02 QJO 025—— 
Stock Dividend Ratio Mean 55.50% 53.88% 63.66% 
(without weighting) — Std. Dev. 11.03% 20.64% 52.08% 
Median 55.50% 49.88% 57.69% 
-J——stock Dividend “ 12 13% 
I , ： 二 ‘ Hiv/iHAnH ( 观 、 b I 一 2 5 0 ^ ~ 32 
M^ium Stock Dividend | 一 1 25% 12 56% 
I Hinh Stock Dividend (50-100%) I "“ 1 25%" 9 41%" 10 11% 
I inn% Stock Dividend Ratio I - | 1 5% 4 4% 
Sources: the same as in Table 2. 
Notes: a. Stock dividends for public shareholders in 1993. b. Percentage refers to ratio of no. of new shares per original shares. 
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It can be seen in Table 3 that over 80 per cent of listed firms pursue stock 
dividend policies. Stock dividend has par value ofRMB 1.00 and thus can explain on 
average 50 per cent of earnings. Most firms distributed 30 per cent stock dividend 
(three new shares per ten shares held). Some of them even distributed 100 per cent 
stock dividends (i.e., 1 new share per original share) to imply earnings over RMB 1.00 
per share. For most listed firms，stock dividend ratio is below 50 per cent because of 
earnings constraints. 
Data Support for Hypothesis 8: Net 
Negative Dividend Policies 
Dividend policy, in a broad sense or in Chinese investors' understanding, also 
includes rights issue policy. Only the existing shareholders deserve the rights issue; no 
matter the price or the ratio, rights issue won't change the shareholders' equity stake. 
However，the price of rights issue is required to be no less than net assets value per 
share by government policies and by firms' customary practices (normally, net assets 
value per share of listed firms in China is at least RMB 1.50，more than par value). The 
most conservative rights issue ratio is 10 per cent (10 shares will have the rights to 
subscribe to 1 new share). That is, listed firms want more than RMB 0.15 per share 
through the rights issue. Since most listed firms have an average dividend payout ratio 
less than RMB 0.15 per share, the preliminary conclusion is that the dividend policies 
mixing with rights issue, as practiced by a significant number of listed firms, are in 
substance, net negative dividend policies. 
• » 
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It is found that 15 of the 22 listed firms listed in 1992 or before applied rights 
issue policies on the basis of their performance in 1992; 6 of them had rights issue rates 
between 30 to 50 per cent. 
For 1993 earnings, 32 of 90 firms listed before the end of Feb. 1994 applied 
rights issue policies with sharply declining rights issue ratios，as indicated in Table 4. 
As the listings of 76 of the 90 firms were completed in 1993 (another one re-listed in 
this year), the proceeds of the initial issues basically met the demand for fresh capital. 
Putting this into consideration, the author believes the average rights issue ratio of this 
year is still notable. 3 listed firms' rights issue ratios even reach above 50 per cent (if 
we consider the warrant transference from state and legal shareholders to public 
shareholders，there would be 4 such firms). 
Table 4 
An Overview of Rights 丨ssue 91-93，of 
Shenzhen listed Firms 
— I 1991 1992 1993' 
No. of Samples 4 22 90 
No. of Firms with Rights issue 15 32 
1 right (to 1 share) per 10 s h a r e s ~ 2 3 
‘ 3 rights per 10 shares or below~一 7 11 
5 right per 10 shares or below 6 8 
above 5 rights per 10 shares 4 
Sources: the same as in Table 2. 
Notes: 
a. data of rights issue to public shareholders. b. data are available for only 26 firms. 
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Due to lack of information from companies on rights issue policies announced � 
in 1993 on their 1992 performance, hereafter only those announced in 1994 on 1993 
performance are to be surveyed. Referring to Table 5，due to lack of data on rights 
issue prices for some firms, 26 listed firms are chosen as samples. 
Table 5 
An Overview of 93' Net Negative Dividend Policies 
No. of Samples ^ 26 
"“ ―“ All Shareholders Public Shareholders 
Positive Dividend ® 0 0 
Zero Dividend 1 1 
Negative Dividend 25 25 
1) without cash dividend 6 10 
2) with cash dividend “ ^ 15 
3) with rights issue when 1 1 
at loss 
Sources: the same as in Table 2. 
Notes: 
a It means that cash dividend is enough to pay for rights issue; 
b. Cash dividend isn't enough for rights issue outlay. There are 6 listed firms whose cash 
. dividend is less than 10% of cash-in due to rights issue. 
It can be seen from Table 4 that all rights issue policies are actually "net 
negative dividend" policies. Cash inflow from rights issue of 12 firms is 10 times more 
than cash outflow through dividends. 
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Data Support for Hypothesis 4: Complexity 
of Dividend Policies 
Table 6 
An Overview of Complexity of 93' Dividend Policies 
off StienzKen Listed Firms 
Total No. of Firms: 22 
Simple Dividend Policies I L 
1 .cash dividend only 
2.stock dividend only Z 
3.no cash or stock dividend ^ 
4.rights issue only ？ 
Complicated Dividend Polices — 
1 .both cash and stock dividend 
• 2.cash dividend and rights issue ] 
3.stock dividend and rights issue ？ 
Highly Complicated Dividend Policies 
cash, stock dividend and rights issue ？1 
Different Dividend Policies to Different Shareholders 
(DDDs) 
1.cash dividend for unlisted share holders, stock dividend for 6 
listed share holders; 
2.cash and stock dividend for unlisted share holders, stock 5 
dividend for listed share holders; 
5.stock dividend for unlisted share holders, cash and stock 5 
dividend for listed share holders. 
Different Rights issue Policies 
No. of Firms — 
1 .direct subscription, warrants not listed; 15 
2.warTants of unlisted shares transferred to listed share 
holders: 
1) two warrants listed together ^ 
2) two warrants listed separated as Warrant A1 and A2 IJ 
- a.rights issue based on share numbers ex-dividend ？ 
Sources: the same as in Table 2. 
In Table 6, the complexity of each listed firm's dividend policies will be given 
an arbitrary score according to method described below. 
1. No Dividends + 1 � 
2. Distributing Cash Dividends + 10 
\ 
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1) only to unlisted share holders extra +5 
2) less dividends to unlisted share holders 
than to unlisted share holders +5 
3. Distributing Stock Dividends + 1 � 
1) only to listed share holders extra +5 
2) less stock dividends to unlisted share holders 
than to listed share holders 3) includes capitalization of collective reserve +5 
4. Rights issue 
1) based on share number ex-dividends extra +’ 
2) transferring warrants of non-listed share holders +5 
to listed share holders 
3) all warrants listed 
4) warrants of listed shares listed +5 
Giving scores according to the method above, we can calculate the scores of 
average complexity for 90 listed firms to be 26.7. The complexity is obvious. 
By a comprehensive study of Table 6，we know that more than 80 per cent of 
listed firms (60 listed firms) distribute dividends in the forms of both cash and stock 
to deliver the message of corporate earning levels and cash positions. 32 firms offered 
rights issue, 2 of them did not distribute any dividends. 23 of them distributed both 
cash and stock dividends before rights issue, indicating good liquidity position and 
optimistic attitude. High complexity of dividend policies is reflected not only in more 
than 25 per cent listed firms carrying out policies that include cash dividends，stock 
dividends, and rights issue offers but also in DDDs being adopted by a number of 
. l i s t e d firms (explained below in the discussion of hypothesis 5). 
Data Support for Hypothesis 5: Dividend Policies 
Cause Changes Of Equity Stakes 
Referring to Table 6, we know that 16 of 69 firms, that distributed cash and 
stock dividend for 1993，applied different dividend policies relating to different share 
holders; 6 firms distributed stock dividend to listed share holders (public and employee 
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employee share holders) and cash dividend to unlisted share holders (state / legal share 
holders); 5 firms distributed stock dividend to listed share holders and cash +(small 
quantity o f ) stock dividend to unlisted share holders; another 5 firms distributed stock 
+ (small quantity o f ) cash dividend to listed share holders and only cash dividend to 
unlisted share holders. 
Table 7 
A Comparison off Dividend Policies to Different Shareholders 
Company Codes“""“ A: Extra B: Increase of ~ C : O r i g i n a l [ E: Equity Change 
Cash Net Assets Equity Structure D： Equity 
(RMB) Per (RMB) (Per (unlisted /listed, structure Ex-
10 Shares 10 Shares) %/%) dividend (unlisted 
Of unlisted Of listed /listed, %/%) 
Share Share 
Holders Holders 





Shareholders ^ ^ , . . 
-0509 3 00 6.15 70.38/29.02 64.63/35.37 -8.17/+19.41 
-0513 1T80/52.20 41.31/58.69 -13.60/+12.43 
-0548 2 " 0 0 ~ 3.80 64.87/35.13 60.61/38.39 -6.57/+9.28 
"0551 " Z j j L — jgM^Q-QQ 55.56/44.44 -7.40/+11.11 
0553 ^ 3.66 56.86/43.14 52.34/47.66 -7.95/+10.48 
2. Cash Dividends 
For Public 
Shareholders, Cash& 
Stock Dividend for 
State/Legal 
Shareholders — � 八 一 , ^ ^ __ 
" O ^ 3 00 10.81 49.30/50.70 43.30/56.70 -12.17/+12.70 
" O ^ " 7 ^ / 2 5 . 0 0 70.59/29.41 -5.89/+17.65 
"OsSo 3.29 70.30/29.70 67.44/32.56 -4.07/+9.63 
"0544 3 00 "5.34 "70^.00/30.00 64.61/35.39 -7.70/+17.97 
0564 1^00 1-78 45.31/54.69 43.33/56.67 -4.37/-t-3.62 
3. Cash And Stock~ 




Shareholders , — 
"0519 1 00 2 11 70.99/29.01 67.85/32.15 -4.42/+10.82 
" O ^ 3 00 8.01 Tr25/28.75 65.59/34.41 -7.94/+19.69 
"0537 " ^ 3 / 3 4 . 3 7 63.10/36.90 -4.00/+7.67 
- 0 ^ 5 " ^ 2 / 4 2 . 0 8 " 55.59/44.41 -4.02/+5.54 
0550 I 2.00 I 3.26 174.48/25.52 68.85/31.15 -7.56/+22.06 
Sources: the same as in Table 2. 
� 
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It's worth to note that, if we equate each stock dividend to RMB 1.00 in cash 
according to its par value, public share holders and state / legal share holders both 
receive equal value of dividends even with different distribution methods. 
We know that par value does not reflect real value. The market price and net 
assets per share of public shares ex-right / dividend are usually higher than RMB 1.00. 
If public share holders receive more stock dividend per share than state and legal share 
holders do, their equity proportion will correspondingly increase. The actual gain of 
public share holders is more than their opportunity loss (costs) in cash. Table 7 shows 
that since the net asset value per share ex right / dividend is more than RMB 1.00，the 
gain of public share holders in asset value due to extra stock dividends is larger than 
the cash loss due to lower cash dividends. If RMB 1.00 net asset value is equivalent to 
RMB 1.00 cash, 1/2 of the difference between column a and b would be the extra gain 
of public share holders in dividend distribution, and 1/2 of the difference would be the 
extra loss of unlisted share holders. Not considering cash dividends, public share 
holders gain more stock dividend causing their equity stake percentages to improve: 
public share percentages of 11 firms are improved by 10 per cent. Even so, public 
shares of most firms have not changed from minority position (<50 per cent) to a 
controlling position. 
At the same time warrants of 5 listed firms' state and legal share 
holders are transferred to public share holders at the consideration of RMB 0.05-0.10. 
This causes further dilution of state and legal share holders' equity stake. 
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5.3 Further Explanatioas 
Hypotheses posed in Section 5.1 are tested by data of Section 5.2. In other 
words，the features of dividend policies of Shenzhen listed firms are: 1) low cash 
dividend payout ratio; 2) high stock dividend payout ratio; 3) constant practice of 
rights issues; 4) insisting dividend distribution even when there exists strong demand 
for new fiinds; 5) different distribution and rights issue policies to shareholders of 
different natures. 
Further explanations are given here: 
(A) Low cash dividend payout ratio is understandable. Retained earnings is 
usually the cheapest money source for most firms planning to expand production. 
It is also reasonable to suspect that many listed firms, when reporting 
satisfactory earnings, put in some long term investment projects such as property 
investment and demand for higher working capital, so that it subsequently results in 
cash illiquidity. On the contrary, many newly-listed firms have strong cash inflow from 
the initial public offering, but do not think it acceptable to return part of this money to 
investors. The low cash dividend payout ratio is almost necessary because of financing 
rigidity. 
1 .. - -. 
Besides, customarily, in the calculation of dividend payout ratio, stock dividend 
is included (by its par value) as is cash. It not only weakens the "signaling effect" of 
cash, but also provides the possibility and a channel to avoid cash outflow. 
From the viewpoint of investors, the high volatility of stock market causes 
investment returns to largely depend on stock price changes (capital appreciation). No 
matter how much dividend there is, it only occupies a negligible position in the total 
\ 
32 
return to investors. Investors attempt to make profits from "buy low, sell high" instead 
of obtaining regular, stable dividends. This phenomenon is perhaps due to the lack of 
participation of institutional investors such as trust fiinds and pension fiinds, etc., who 
rely on dividend revenue as consumption source. And it is also noticed that the average 
age of investors is lower than their western counterparts (see Shefiin and Statman 
[1984]). In addition, there is short term speculation: the average turnover rate in 1994 
is above five hundred per cent. It makes cash dividend less important, or even 
unnecessary. 
(B) Stock dividend policies are essentially a "mathematics game," same as 
stock splits. Stock splits can reduce the minimum tradable quantity. The minimum 
trade quantity is one lot. The lower the price, the less money one trade lot needs. It 
helps to enhance investing ability of small investors. Secondly, psychologists believe 
that low price has more flexibility. Shares with appreciation potential would more 
easily appreciate after stock splits. 
Besides, in the customary practices in China stock market, stock dividends 
reflect earnings levels. It's a good substitute for cash dividend as a "signal". 
In addition, collective reserves can be capitalized through stock dividend 
distribution, showing: 1) good previous earnings; 2) confidence in future achievements; 
3) arousing attention of investors (Doran, 1994 ). 
(C) Many listed firms apply rights issue policies as complementary parts of 
dividend policies, causing actual negative dividends for the same reasons as of low 
cash dividends. Quota restrictions of new issue, divergence of planned capital inflow 
and actual demand caused by unstable economic climate, etc., will also be the reasons. 
\ 
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It should be noted that rights issue is of mandatory nature to some extent: if 
there is a big discount between market price and rights issue price, investors who give 
up rights have to assume some loss. 
(D) Many listed firms apply consciously and unconsciously complicated and 
integrated policies of distributing both cash and stock dividend together with rights 
issue at the same time. It may be connected with saving agency costs (Easterbrook 
[1984]). Therefore, to insist on a little cash dividend while there is strong demand for 
the rights issue，is to use the "signal effect" fiinction to show healthy financial position. 
The rights issue here is not problem oriented but prospect oriented. 
These practices emerge at the very beginning and become the pattern for 
dividend policies of listed firms right from the beginning. 
Usually, there is a set minimum dividend payout ratio in company articles. Thus 
firms have to distribute both cash and stocks to meet these ratios, or, to meet the 
double psychological demand of investors: to have both more cash and more stocks. 
(E) It is found that the so called "same share, same right" is not reflected 
correctly in dividend policies. Else how can one explain state / legal shareholders, as 
controlling shareholders, apparently formulating policies unfavorable for themselves? 
Actually, state / legal shareholders have a significant cash preference. Since 
their shares can not be listed, and thus very illiquid, the annual cash dividend is the 
main return of their investment. To them, dividend policies are not irrelevant but 
extremely relevant. 
The demand for cash realization of main shareholders, especially those state 
shareholders goes against the listed firms' will of expansion. Firms have limited abilities 
to pay cash dividend. Therefore, the main shareholders have to pay the consideration 
\ 
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of equity dilution to obtain more cash dividend. As the controlling positions would not 
be fundamentally changed after dilution and individual representatives of state / legal 
shares usually do not have the will to maximize the shareholders' earnings, the 
outcomes reflected by data of last section should not be astonishing. 
Because of differences on liquidity nature of different shares, the author 
believes such dividend policies will result in a win-win situation instead of a "zero-
sum" effect. Although such policies violate the principle of "same share, same right"， 
they indeed meet the requirements of both sides. Gradually losing controlling right 
arouses attention of government, but this situation in the author's opinion will not 
change fundamentally until state / legal shares have been listed. 
It is worth mentioning that money in the hands of state/legal share holders is 
scarce to meet rights issue because their portfolios can not be adjusted. Dilution of 
equity seems to accord with the demands for company development. 
In the end, it should be mentioned that, in the past，main shareholders of listed 
firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen often gave up rights because of shortage of cash. This 
behavior was favorable neither to firms nor to major shareholders themselves. Till last 
year, state / legal shareholders of some firms in Shanghai transferred their rights to 
public shareholders for the consideration of transfer fee. The cheap transfer fee didn't 
retrieve much loss of these shareholders. Since last September, a number of Shenzhen 
listed firms invented a smarter way by which they listed rights warrants of state / legal 
shares (warrant A2) together with those of public shares (warrant Al) Before any 
specific policies are promulgated, shares bought by exercising warrant A2 will not be 
listed. Thus, the market may give fair prices to such rights and transfer such rights to 
investors who can afford them. It is interesting that warrant A2 usually becomes 
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worthless right before delisting. It shows great discount between non-listed and listed 
stocks. It also supports the cash preference of state/legal shareholders. 
5.4 Preliminary Kvidence for M&^^t Response of 
Dividend Policies o f Sh應hen Listed Firms 
Tables 
A Comparison of Market Performance in 1994 of 
Shenzhen Listed Firms 
Change of SHENZHEN Security Index -40% 
of 1994 
Investment Return Rate of 1994 (Listed -39-40 % 
Firms Listed before Jan 3，1994) 
Investment Return Rate of Listed -39.88% 
Firms Distributing Cash and Stock Dividends 
without Rights Issue (37 Listed Firms) 
1) Investment Return Rate of -35.36% 
Listed Firms Applying Different Dividend 
Policies to Different Shareholders ( 8 Listed 
Firms): 
2) Investment Return Rate of -41.12% 
Listed Firms Applying Same Policies (29 Listed 
Firms): 
Investment Return Rate of Listed -38.71% 
Firms Distributing Cash and Stock Dividends 
with Rights Issue (11 Listed Firms) 
Sources: the same as in Table 2. 
Investors are indifferent to dividend policies according to M&M Model. 
Dividend policies do not bring abnormal gains But in an imperfect market like the 
stock market in China, such contention may not be valid. 
As listed firms in China have a short history, investors have difficulties to make 
rational expectations towards dividend policies, thereby, they can not make a 
reasonable comparison between estimation and reality. As the systematic risk beta is 
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whether dividend policies bring investors risk-adjusted abnormal gains. Due to the 
above difficulties, the author cannot provide a discussion in depth. 
The author has chosen 37 firms that were listed before Jan. 3rd, 1994 and 
distribute cash and stock dividend without rights issue. Making an adjustment to their 
stocks, opening and closing prices of year 94 (reverse calculation of ex-dividend), we 
have an average return rate of -39.88% in 1994 which is similar with the average 
return rate of Shenzhen Securities Composite Index in 1994. As to the 8 listed firms 
which apply DDDs，the average return rate is -35.36%，higher than that of 29 firms 
that do not apply different policies. Because it's hard to isolate other influential 
factors, the data may only be a coincidence. Yet it can not be denied that different 
dividend policies to different shareholders might be more popular. 
As to the 11 listed firms which distribute cash and stock dividends together 
with rights issue, the average return rate of their stocks is -38.71% , slightly higher 
than that of firms without rights issue -39.88%. It shows that so far, investors have not 




A TIME SERIES AND CROSS-SECTIONAL 
COMPARISON AMONG DIVIDEND 
POLICIES 
6,1 Comparison of Cash Dividends in 92 / 93 
In Table 9,22 firms listed before 1993 are chosen as samples to make a vertical 
comparison between 1992 and 1993 dividend policies; only 5 firms were listed before 
1992. 
Table 9 
A Comparison of Cash Dividend Payout Ratio of 
22 Listed Firms in 1992/1993 
Cash Dividend T o ^ 1993 
Payout Ratio 
12.77% 16.41% 
Std. Deviation 5.16% 13.60%•"”一 
~ Median 11.65% 12.27% 
Sources: the same as in Table 2. 
# . • 二 
. . . • • J , " , . 
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It can be found that, 18 of them distributed more cash dividends in 1993 than 
they used to do, because of increasing net earnings per share (20 firms). The average 
cash dividend payout ratio is higher than that of 1992 (16.41% to 12.77%). However， 
only 13 firms achieved higher cash dividend payout ratios. 
Table 10 
Relationship of Company Profit, Cash Dividend and Cash Dividenfl 
Payout Ratios of 22 listed firms 1992/1993 (after adjustment) 
No.of A Profit A Dividends A Dividend 
listed Payout Ratio 
firms 
— 1 3 + + — + 
5 + + -
2 + -
2 - I - -
Sources: the same as in Table 2. 
The information in Table 10 is quite different with prevailing fixed dividend or 
payout ratio policies adopted in western countries. When earnings of listed firms 
increase, most firms in western countries lower dividend payout ratios correspondingly 
to maintain the fixed dividend, or distribute dividends as per payout ratio. Table 9 
shows that among the 20 Shenzhen listed firms with increasing earnings, 13 had higher 
‘cash dividend payout ratios. It's also surprising that 2 of them even lowered the 
absolute amount of cash dividends; another 2 with falling earnings did not distribute 
cash dividends at all. The phenomenon may be due to the common practice of dividend 
payout ratio ( (cash dividend + stock dividend) / earning ); or that the data after 
» 
39 
adjustment (to treat stock dividends as stock split ) fail to reflect the natures of 
dividend policies. 
� 
Systematization of unadjusted data shown in Table 10 is similar with those in 
Table 9. Only 2 listed firms maintain cash dividends with changing earnings. Variation 
of cash dividend payout ratio seems more unpredictable. 
From above, it is clear that the listed firms in China usually do not possess 
strong wills to maintain fixed dividends or payout ratios; when earnings drop，they 
often omit cash dividend - an approach opposed to that of western firms. 
Table 11 
Relationship of Company Profit, Cash Dividend and Cash Dividend 
Payout Ratio of 22 listed firms 1992/1993 (before adjustment) 
N o . o f ~ A Profit A Dividends A Dividend 
listed Payout Ratio 
firms — 
_ _ 1 2 + + I + 
3 + 1 ： 1 + No Change ： 
‘ 3 + - ： 
1 - No Change + 
2 I - I • I 
Sources: the same as in Table 2. 
aa Conroarison of Canh Dj^ideiid 
Payout Ratio amoti^ I n d t t s t r i e s 
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In Table 12, 73 listed firms of obvious industry affiliation and listings before 
February 94 are chosen as samples. Some industries do not have many firms, whether 
their average cash dividend payout ratio is representational is questionable. Ranking as 
per cash dividend payout ratio from high to low, the order goes: commerce, 
petrochemicals, electronics, finance, property, textile, infrastructure, conglomerates, 
and electrical & mechanical. The ranking is interesting. For example, infrastructure 
industry is usually Unked to high dividends in western countries, but the situation is the 
reverse in China. It shows infrastructure in China is in an expanding stage. Other 
industries, lack comparability because of shortage of historical data and remarkable 
difference in corporate sizes and equity structures. Accordingly, it will be very difficult 
to carry out fiirther researches. 
TABLE 12 
A Comparison of 1993 Cash Dividend 
Payout Ratios among Industries 
Industries • “ N o . o f M e a n Cash StST 




shareholder s j 
Conglomerates 9 10-70% 7.36% 
• Proi^rtv 9 1 3 . 3 1 % _ _ _ 1 4 . 1 6 % 
Infr^ructure — 9 12 .98%__10.82% 
Commerce 7 44.96o/o__18.91% 
Finance 一 3 16.50% 28.58% 
Electronics 12 19 .72%__15.23% 
po 咖v^jjyjgfjij^i^ 10 6.020/0 1010% 
Medicine 4 2 2 . 0 1 % 1 6 - 3 0 % 
Textile 6 13.31% 19.99% 
Petrochemical 4 40.99% 38.88% 
Sources: the same as in Table 2. 
t 




The author finds that China Shenzhen publicly listed firms set low cash 
dividend policies because they are in an expanding stage, there is high friction in the 
Chinese capital markets, and there is no cash preference by the public share investors. 
The author also finds that listed firms use stock dividend as a substitute for 
cash dividend to execute signal function. The idea that the value of stock dividend is 
equal to its par value, accepted through customary practices, makes dividend payout 
ratios ((cash + stock dividend)/eamings) the target ratios of company dividend policies 
instead of the cash dividend payout ratios. As a result, listed firms have much freedom 
in cash dividend distribution. 
It is interesting that a number of listed firms insist on distributing dividend first 
when they desire new capital. The author does not believe it to be a mere coincidence 
that agency theory gains support in China stock market. 
Many listed firms treat shareholders differently by mixing cash dividends and 
stock dividends in different weights and violate the principle of "same share, same 
right". The Government is worried about dilution of state equity due to such dividend 
policies. However, under the influence of differing liquidities，and rapidly increasing 
private savings as against tight government financial condition, such practice may 
cause a win-win effect. 
42 
From the comparison of different cash dividend policies in Chapter 6, we find 
not only that the general cash dividend payout ratios of China Shenzhen listed firms are 
relatively low but also that the cash dividend payout ratios have an unstable nature. 
Moreover, the pattern of industry difference is very dissimilar to its western 
counterpart. 
It can not be judged if such dividend policies of Shenzhen listed firms are 
optimized. Yet it can be contended that dividend policies in China do affect corporate 
values, and such effects may be more in-depth than in their western counterparts. 
This is only a preliminary study. Topics worthy of future studies definitely 
include how the market reacts to dividend announcement. Other topics of interest are 
the relationship between dividends and corporate size，leverage, and ownership 
diffiision. 
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